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RECENT CASES.
ASSIGNMENTS--FOREIGN CREDITORS' RIGHTS.-BLOOMINGDALE V. WELL,
70 PAC. 94 (WAs.).-Foreign creditors, through proceedings in the local
courts, attached property covered by a foreign voluntary assignment to
another party. Held, that foreign creditors do not, by virtue of entering
suit in the local courts, acquire the right of local creditors to have the
assignment set aside.
There has been frequent discussion as to the operation of voluntary
assignments in other States, and the weight of authority seems to be that
such assignments will be respected, except when in conflict with the rights
of local creditors. Barnett v. Kinney, 147 U. S. 476; May v. Wannenzacher,
III Mass. 2o2; Lowry v. Hall, 2 W. & S. (Pa.) 131; Woodward v. Brooks,
128 II1. 222. In Palmer v. Mason, 42 Mich. 146, the assignee's title to real
property is held to be superior to that of attaching creditors. The New
York doctrine is more liberal towards the foreign creditor, allowing him to
pursue his remedy in the local courts with the same rights to priority as a
local creditor would have. Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367; 3 Am. & Eng.
En.c. Law 51. Ex parte Dickinson, 29 S. Car. 453, holds that a preferential
foreign assignment is vdid, and that another foreign creditor may acquire a
lien by subsequently attaching realty. See also Exchange Bank v. Stelling,
31 S. Car. 360.
BANKRUPTCY-INVOLUNTARY PETITION-PROVABLF CLAIMS.-IN RE STERN,
i16 FED. 6o4.-A company which was furnishing its customers ice, under
contracts covering a period of several years, broke such contracts and became
unable to continue them in the future. Held, that claims of customers for
damages sustained by reason of the company's inability to fulfill the executory
portion of such contracts were "provable claims," under section 63 of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, defining provable claims as those founded on
contract.
Though the question as to what constitutes a provable claim has been
much discussed, it seems clear that no debt can be proved unless it exists
at the time of filing the petition; Collier on Bankruptcy 351; In re Crawford,
Fed. Cas., No. 3363; or, following the same authorities, at the time of the
adjudication. In re Hennocksburgh, Fed. Cas., No. 6367. The question then
remains, is an unliquidated claim, founded on an executory contract, which
the bankrupt has repudiated, such an existing debt before the time for ful-
fillment of the agreement. Though on this point the cases disagree, the
decision in the present case, holding that a right of action accrues immediately,
plainly follows the weight of authority, both in England, Hochster v. De La
Tour, 2 El. & BI. 678, and in this country; Burtis v. Thompson, 42 N. Y.
246; even though the contract be divisible. Roehin v. Horst, 178 U. S. I.
Even in Massachusetts, where the contrary view is most strongly held,
Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530, the decisions are not uniform. Newcomb
v. Brackett, 16 Mass. 161.
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BANKRUPTCY-JUDGMENT ENFORCING LIEN-JURISDICTION OF BANKRUPTCY
COURT.-METCALF BROS. v. BARKER, TRUSTEE, 23 Sup. CT. REP. 67.-Action
was commenced against a creditor nearly two years before the filing of his
petition in bankruptcy. Final judgment was entered within four months
before the date of filing. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provides that judg-
ments obtained within such time are invalid and, consequently, an injunction
was granted forbidding further proceedings on the judgment. Held, that
judgment creditors, by commencing action more than four months before
the date of filing, acquired an equitable lien on debtor's property which
could not be invalidated by the provisions of the act.
The court in this case has followed the general rule that the filing of a
judgment creditor's bill creates an equitable lien. Storm v. Waddell, 2 Sandf.
Ch. 494; Miller v. Sherry, 2 Wall. 237. It was contended that such lien,
being contingent upon the recovery of a judgment, must depend also upon
the judgment's validity. But a judgment creditor's lien is considered equiva-
lent to an equitable levy. Freedmen's Say. & T. Co. v. Earle, 110 U. S. 710.
The court further held that the District Court of the United States was
without jurisdiction to issue an injunction in this case under the rule recently
reiterated in Louisville Trust Co. v. Cominger, 184 U. S. 18, that Federal
Courts may not interfere to affect the validity of the judgments of State
tribunals.
BANKRUPTcY-LIABILITY ON LEASE.-IN RE HAYS, FOSTER & WARD Co.,
117 FED. 879.-Held, where a tenant is adjudged a bankrupt, such adjudication
terminates the existing relation of landlord and tenant, and the landlord is
not entitled to prove, as against the bankrupt's estate a claim for rent
accruing after the adjudication.
The most recent decisions are not in accord as to the rights of a
landlord against his tenant in bankruptcy. In re Mitchell, i6 Fed. 87, holds
that a landlord has a lien for rent growing due, basing the decision on a
priority law of the State. A State statute may grant to a landlord such a
lien in case of attachment, but it does not apply to a tenant in bankruptcy.
In re Jefferson, 93 Fed. 948. The adjudication terminates all contractual
relations. In re Webb, 29 Fed. Cas. 494. A claim for future rent is not a
fixed liability. Bankrupt Act, 1898, Sec. 63. Only rent in arrear can be
made the subject of distress. Bray v. Cobb, ioo Fed. 272.
CARRIERS-STREET RAILWAY TRANSFERS-MISTAKE OF AGENT.-LAWSIIE
v. TACOMA RY. Co., 70 PAC. 118 (WASI[.).-A passenger received a transfer
to a line other than the one he requested. On refusal of the conductor to
accept it, he declined to pay further fare, and was ejected. Held, the com-
pany was liable.
The authorities are in conflict, many of them holding that the ticket is
the sole criterion of the passenger's right of passage, and if he is ejected
because of a defective ticket, his only remedy is an action for negligent
mistake, or for breach of contract and not for expulsion. Bradshaw v.
Boston Ry. Co., 135 Mass. 407; Vestern Ry. Co. v. Stocksdale. 83 Md. 245;
Yorton r. Milwaukce Ry. Co., 54 Wis. 234; Poulin v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co.,
6 U. S. App. 298. Other courts have held that the passenger so ejected
may maintain an action for his ejection. Muckle v. Rochester Ry. Co., 79
Hun 32; O'Rourke v. Railwey Co., 1o3 Tenn. 124. In Krueger v. R. R. Co.,
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68 Minn. 445. it was held that if the circumstances show a probability of a
mistake on the part of the company, the conductor will not be justified in
ejecting him without further inquiry.
CHECK-LIABILITY OF DRAWER-PRESENTATION.-EDM ISTEN V. IlERPOL-
IIEIMER ET AL., 92 N. W. 138 (NEB.).-In the absence of special circumstances,
in order to hold the drawer liable on his check, held, that it must be pre-
sented not later than the day following its receipt, provided the payee
receives it in the same place in which the bank is located upon which it is
drawn. Sedgwick, J., dissenting.
The present tendency of the courts, as indicated by the Negotiable
Instruments Law, New York Laws 1897, Chap. 612, is to require presentation
within a reasonable time, determined by the facts in each case. Grafton Nat.
Bank v. Buckhannon Nat. Bank, 8o Md. 475; Robinson v. Ames, 20 Johns. 146.
Although supported by some authority the decision in the case in hand would
seem arbitrary and not according to the best decisions. Smith v. Jones, 20
Wend. 192; Gowan v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 176.
CONSIDERATION-PAYMENT OF DEBT OF THIRD PARTY-PROMISE TO REPAY.
-THOMSON ET AL. v. THOMSON, 78 N. Y. SUPP. 38g.-Plaintiffs being under
no obligation to pay defendant's debt, did so without request but were after-
wards promised reimbursement by defendant. Held, plaintiff could not
recover on subsequent promise as it was without consideration.
The English cases relied on decide instances where the promise is based
on a mere moral obligation and do not refer to cases where one does what
another was legally bound to do. Ealrstwood v. Kenyon, ii Adolph. &. E. 438.
The text writers support the proposition that where one pays a 'debt for
another who subsequently promises reimbursement the law will imply a
previous request. I Parsons, Cont. 495. All cases directly applicable hold
contrary to the finding in this instance. Doty v. Wilson, 14 Johns. (N. Y.)
378; Gleason v. Dyke, 22 Pick. 390; Boothe v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Vt. 681.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-LIMITING HOURS OF EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN.-
STATE v. BUCHANAN, 70 PAC. 52 (WASH.).-Held, a statute providing that
no female shall be employed in certain business establishments more than io
hours in a day, is constitutional.
In Com. v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Mass. 383. it was held that a statute
limiting the hours of labor of women in factories was a valid health regula-
tion. But an almost identical statute was held unconstitutional as restricting
liberty of contract in Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98. So a statute of Utah
limiting hours of labor in mines was upheld in Holden v. lardy, t69 U. S.
366, where it is laid down that a reasonable limitation. necessary for the
preservation of health of employes. i; within police powers. But In re
Morgan. 26 Colo. 415. holds that mere fact of probable injury to health of
employes is not a valid support for such a statute, where there is no injury
to general public. In New York, on ground of protection to public. hours
of labor on railroads may be limited; People v. Phyfe. 136 N. Y. 554: also
in bakeries. People v. Lochner. 73 N. Y. App. Div. i-o. While impossible
to reconcile the decisions, the weight of authority seems to sustain at least
such sttlntes as the one passed upon here. Tied.. Fed. Con. of Pers. and
r'op., par. tO2.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER-REGULATION OF SHEEP HERDING.-
SWEET v. BALLENTINE, 69 PAC. 995 (IDAHO).-Held, statutes prohibiting the
grazing and herding of sheep within two miles of inhabited dwellings, are
valid police regulations. Affirming Sifers v. Johnson, 65 Pac. 709 (Idaho).
No such law as this appears to exist in any other State. Apparently
the only authority on the subject is 2 Tica., Fed. Con. of Pers. and Prop.
p. 838: "The clash of interests between stock-raising and farming calls for
the interference of the State by the institution of police regulations; and
whether the regulations shall subordinate the stock-raising interest to that
of farming, or vice versa, is a matter for the legislative discretion, and is not
a judicial question." Stockslager, J., strongly dissents, and holds that to give
one citizen an advantage over another in the mere matter of the use of
public domain, or in mere matter of general privileges and advantages, is
an unconstitutional discrimination.
CUSTOMS DUTIES--IMPORTATIONS FROm ALGERIA-QUESTION FOR THE
COURT.-TARTAR CHEMICAL CO. V. UNITED STATES, II6 FED. 726.-The board
of general appraisers connected with the State Department had decided,
contrary to the evidence furnished by the French government, that Algeria
is not a part of France, but simply a French colony and not within the
scope of the reciprocal commercial agreement between France and the
United States. On appeal, held, that this is a judicial question for the
courts and not a political one on which the determination of an executive
department is conclusive.
It is clear that section 15 of the Customs Administrative Act, 26 U. S.
Stat. 137, under which jurisdiction is claimed to try cases on appeal from
the board of appraisers, does not apply to "political" questions, which have
always been held to be under the control of the executive branch of the
government. Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 17o. The jurisdiction of
the court then depends entirely upon whether this question is political or
not, and on this point it is difficult to see the correctness of this decision. As
is admitted in the opinion, if there was any dispute as to the boundaries or
sovereignty of a foreign state, it would be a political question. Foster v.
Neilsor, 2 Pet. 253; Guadalupe Co. v. Wilson Co., 58 Tex. 228. So also if it
were a question of the recognition of a foreign state. Luther v. Borden, 7
Howard I. "Nor is it material to inquire, nor the province of the court to
determine whether the executive be right or wrong." Williams v. Ins. Co.,
13 Pet. 415. Just what questions are "political" has never been judicially
determined, and the opinion in the present case holds that the questions
involved in such cases as those described above are 'political, only because
connected with some dispute between States. But if questions concerning
the boundaries of States be political, I Wharton on Internat. Law 551, it is
hard to see why the decision as to whether a certain territory is a separate
colony or an integral part of a foreign state, is not also political; and though
there is no open dispute in the present case, there is a distinct difference of
opinion as to the status of Algeria. The reasoning on which the exclusive
jurisdiction of the executive over political questions is based would seem
to apply. See Williams v. Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415; Foster v'. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253.
GIFTS-CAUSA MORTIS-PUBLIC POLICY.-DENEFF v. HELMS. 70 PAC. 390
(OPF).-Testator just previous to his death, and in expectation of it, de-
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livered a sum of money to defendant, directing him to care for testator till
death, then pay his debts, compensate himself for his services, and turn over
the remainder to testator's sister. Held to be a valid gift causa mortis and
not assets recoverable by plaintiff, testator's administrator.
The plaintiff contended that this was an attempted testamentary disposition
and that defendant was a mere agent. But the court held defendant to be a
trustee for testator's sister. As to the right to couple a gift causa mortis with a
trust without defeating the gift see Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185; Curtiss v.
Say. Bank, 77 Me. 15; Clough v. Clough, 177 Mass. 85; Laucks v. Johnson,
7o Hun. 565; Hills v. Hills, 8 M. & W. 4oi; Schoul., Pers. Prop. (2nd ed.)
Sec. 195; Schoul., Wills, Sec. 271.
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD-TRANSFER OF CUSTODY BY MOTHER-VALIDITY.-
CUSSET V. EuVRARD, 52 ATL. Iiio (N. J.).-The putative father of illegitimate
children took charge of them on an agreement by which the mother trans-
ferred to him all rights to their custody. Held, that the transfer was valid
as against the mother, and being for the interest of the children, would not
he set aside.
Contracts for the surrender of the care and custody of children by
parents are contrary to public policy. Copeland v. State, 6o Ind. 394; People
v. Mercein, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 399. A lawful father cannot by agreement with
the mother divest himself of the custody of his child. Johnson v. Terry, 34
Conn. 259; People v. Mercein, supra. Nor can he deprive her of her rights
by agreement. Moore v. Christian, 56 Miss. 408; State v. Reuff, 29 W. Va.
751. But where such contracts have been made, courts may, for the benefit
of the child, refuse to set them aside. Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 65o. In
regard to the child "the court will not exchange a certainty foir an uncer-
tainty." Drummond v. Ashton, 8 W. N. C. (Pa.) 563; Bryan v. Lyon, 1O4
Ind. 227. In the case of illegitimate children the putative father has no
right to custody as against the mother. Pratt v. Nitz, 48 Iowa 33; People
v. Kling, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 366.
INJUNCTION-AGREEMENT NOT TO OPPOSE.-NATIONAL PHONOGRAPH CO.
V. SCHLEGEL, 117 FED. 624.-Complainant applied for a perpetual injunction
and defendants signified in writing their consent to its issuance. The object
of the transaction was to use the injunction to intimidate others in positions
similar to that of the defendants. Held, that the writ should not issue.
In American Co. v. Vail, i5 Blatch. 315, apparently the only similar
case on record, the injunction asked was granted, but with the specification
that no judgment was passed on the merits of the controversy. The Supreme
Court, in Ford v. Teazie, 8 How. 251, has ruled that a judgment in a suit
at law where there is no real contest is a "nullity." The same principles
apply still more strongly in the case of injunctions, which lie, not as of right,
but in the discretion of the court; Worinser v. Brown, 149 N. Y. 163; Story,
Eq. Jur., loth ed., 959a; and the use of which should be carefully guarded.
Atty.-Gen. v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 370 ;Story, Eq. Jur., 959b.
INJUNCTION-PICKETING.-FOSTER ET AL. v. RETAIL CLERKS' PROTECTIVE'
ASs'N. ET AL., 78 N. Y. Supp. 86o.-Defendants, sympathizers with a labor
union by design and agreement, distributed cards asking union men to keep
away from the store of the plaintiffs and sought by picketing the vicinity tor
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peacefully persuade the public from patronizing their store. Held, an in-
junction would not be granted restraining the defendants.
Questions of this sort frequently arise and the decisions are by no means
uniform. Where one knowingly injures another he must show justification
or privilege. Here public policy is the justification. 8 Har. Law Rev. i.
The recent decisions which separate picketing and peaceful persuasion from
all circumstances of threat warrant the refusal to enjoin. Allen v. Flood,
(1898) App. Cas. i; Justice Holmes in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92.
MASTER AND SERVANT-FELLOW SERVANT-ORMAN ET AL. V. SALVO, 117
FED. 223.-Workmen engaged in constructing a railroad grade were divided
into day and night shifts. A member of the night shift was injured by a
blast, of which no notice was given, while sleeping in a tent provided by
the master. Held, that the fellow servant doctrine did not apply.
In Washburn v. Nashville & C. R. Co., 40 Tenn. 638, the rule is well
stated that one is not a fellow servant unless at the time of the injury he
was acting in the service of the master. The following cases illustrate this
principle; a deck hand not on duty, Ry Co. v. Ross,. 112 U. S. 377; a section
boss, killed while crossing tracks on way home from work, Columbus & T.
R. Co. v. O'Brien, 4 Ohio Cir. Ct. 515; an employee of a factory, injured
by negligence of co-employee in leaving street in front of factory in a
defective and dangerous condition, Baird v. Pettit, 70 Pa. 477. Contra,
railroad employee injured while on cars, but off duty, Ry. Co. v. Ryan, 82
Tex. 565; Ry. Co. v. Welch, 72 Tex. 298.
MINORs-NECESsARIEs-COUNSEL FEEs.-CRAFTS V. CARR, 53 ATL. 27r
(R. I.).-An action for damages for indecent assault was successfully prose-
cuted by an attorney for a 17-year-old minor. After judgment, the minor
attempted to enter into a disadvantageous compromise of the claim, but by
the attorney's efforts the full amount was collected. Held, that the services
of the attorney were necessaries.
There is no unanimity among the authorities as to what shall be the
test to determine whether services rendered by an attorney to a minor are
necessaries. A large class of cases hold that services rendered in relation to
property are not necessaries. Dillon v. Bowles, 77 Mo. 6o3; I6 Am. & Eng.
Ency. Law 275 (2nd ed.). Some authoritie adopt this rule excepting from
it, however, services that are beneficial to the infant's estate. Epperson v.
Nugent, 57 Miss. 45. Probably the best test, and the one sanctioned by the
court in this case, is that no services shall be deemed necessaries unless
indispensable to the personal relief, protection and support of the infant.
Munson v. Washband, 31 Conn. 303; Barker v. Hibbard, 54 N. H. 339.
NEGLIGENCE-INJURIES TO CHILDREN-LIABILITY OF LANDOWNER.-PAOLINO
v. McKENDALL, 53 ATL. 268 (R. I.).-Where an occupant of premises on
which children were accustomed to play, set a fire thereon, and a young
child was attracted thereby and burned, the occupant, though he had taken
no precautionary measures, was held not liable for the injuries.
This case involves an application of the rule in the so-called "turn-table
cases," established by the Supreme Court in Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall.
657. It was there held that an owner of machinery or other property
attractive to children, is liable for injuries happening to them, although
wrongfully interfering with such property on his premises. The court
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rejects this doctrine and holds that precautionar; measures, having for their
object the protection of the public, must have reference to all classes alike.
Decisions on the subject are hopelessly irreconcilable, and seem to be equally
divided. The authority in Rhode Island has hitherto been contra Bishop v.
Railroad Co., 14 R. I. 314.
NEGLIGENCE-INJURY TO RAILROAD EmPLOYE-LIABILITY OF CONNECTING
LINE.-MO., ETC., Ry. Co. v. MERmLL, 70 PAC. 358 (KAN.).-A car, delivered
by one railway company to another, after having been inspected by agents
of the second and allowed to proceed, proved defective, injuring an employee
of the second line. Held, that the delivering company had been relieved of
responsibility.
. This decision overrules Ry. Co. v. Merrill, 61 Kan. 671. The former
decision held that the negligent inspection by the second company did not
remove the liability of the first for delivery in a defective condition. The
present decision distinguishes between the case at bar and those cited ii
support of the former decision, in each of which direct responsibility of the
defendant company was shown. Here the casual connection is broken.
Fowles v. Briggs, 116 Mich. 425; Lellis v. R. Co., 124 Mich. 37. The in-
spection by the second company was a duty enforced by law. R. R. Co. v.
Archbold, 18 Sup. Ct. 777; Ry. Co. v. Barber, 44 Kan. 612. With the con-
trol of the delivering company their liability ceased. Glynn v. R. Co., 175
Mass. 5io; Sawyer v. Ry. Co., 38 Minn. i03; Losee v. Clute, 51 N. Y. 494.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-DEBENTURE. PAYABLE TO BEARER-USAGE-
HOLDER FOR VALUE.-EDELSTEIN V. SCHULER & Co. (1902) 2 K. B. 144.-
Certain debenture bonds, issued by both foreign and domestic. companies
were stolen and the defendants, stock brokers, in good faith, entered into
contracts for their sale. In an action for conversion, it was proved that by
mercantile usage the bonds were treated as transferable by delivery. Held,
that the bonds were negotiable instruments and that when the defendants
received them they became holders for value.
This decision is of interest as tending to harmonize the English law on
this subject with that of other nations. It has been expressly held that the
negotiability of debentures, not being created by the law merchant or by
statute, could not be justified by usage. Crouch v. Credit Foncier of England
(1873), L. R., 8 Q. B. 374. Though considerable doubt has been expressed
as to the authority of this case, it has not before been definitely rejected.
Bechuanaland Exploration Co. v. London Bank (1898), 2 Q. B. 658. Foreign
and colonial bonds and scrip have long been recognized as negotiable in
England. Gorgier v. Mieville (1824), 3 B. & C. 45. In the United States,
corporation bonds under seal and possessing the attributes of negotiable
instruments are generally regarded as such. Colson v. Arnot, 57 N. Y. 253.
PERSONAL INJURIEs-CLAIMS-ASIGNABILITY.-Ry. v. GINTHER. 70 S.
W. 96 (Trx.).-Held, that a cause of action for personal injuries may be
assigned.
Texas Rev. St. 1895, art. 3353 a, provides that such cause of action
shall survive the death of the injured party and changes the law of Texas
laid down in Stewart v. Ry. Co., 62 Tex. 246. Similar statutes have been
passed in Iowa and Minnesota. Vincent v. Ry., 69 Ia. 296; Kent v. Chapel,
67 Minn. 42o. In the great majority of States such causes of action are
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still non-assignable. Oliver v. Walsh, 6 Cal. 456; Ry. v. Maher, 91 Ill. 312;
Linton v. Henley, IO4 Mass. 353; Pulver v. Harris, 52 N. Y. 73; Morris v.
McCulloch, 83 Pa. St. 34; MeArthur & G. B. & M. C. Co., 34 Wis. 139. See
also Comegys v. Vasse, I Pet. 212.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-VENDOR AND PURCHASER-MISTAKE.-VAN
PRAAGH V. EvERinuE (1902), 2 CH. 266 (EN.).-Defendant, a bidder at an
auction through his own carelessness purchased real estate that he had not
intended to buy. He repudiated the bargain at once and refused to sign the
memorandum of sale. Accordingly the auctioneer signed the memorandum
as defendant's agent. Held, that the defendant could not escape specific
performance on the ground of mistake.
Justice Kekewich has relied upon a dictum which holds that if a pur-
chaser makes a careless mistake without reasonable excuse, he should be
held to his bargain. Tainplin v. James (i88o), I5 Ch. 215. But this can
hardly be considered in point as it was decided on a different set of facts.
The better rule seems to be that the defendant might be liable in damages,
but that specific performance of a contract he never intended to make cannot
be enforced. Malins v. Freeman, 2 Keen 25. The contract is nullified where
there is no consensus ad idem. Raffles v. Wiclwlhaus (1864), 2 H. & C. 9o6.
Nor will the law assist the plaintiff to take advantage of the defendant when
the latter points out his mistake as soon as possible. Webster v. Cecil (i86i),
30 Beav. 62.
STREEr RAILROADS-NEGLIGENcE-DuTY TO LOOK.-BEERMAN V. UNION R.
Co., 52 Anm. iogo (R. I.).-Plaintiff drove from a cross street to the track of
an electric railway without seeing an approaching car. The motorman
failed to ring the bell and the plaintiff was injured. Held, that he was
guilty of contributory negligence and could not recover, not having looked
before crossing.
The decision maintains that the rule requiring a man to look and listen
before crossing a steam railway is equally applicable to an electric railway.
This has been affirmed in McGee v. Ry. Co. io2 Mich. io7, and also sub-
stantially in Carson v. Ry. Co., 147 Pa. St. 219; Moore v. Ry. Co., io8 Pa.
St. 349; and Ward v Ry. Co., 63 Hun 624.
SUBTERRANEAN WATERs-RIGHTS OF LANDOWNER-REASONABLE USE-
SALE OF WATER.-KATz ET AL. V. WALIINSHAW, 70 PAC. 663 (CQL.).-DE-
fendant by means of a well on her own land diverted percolating water from
plaintiff's land to sell for distant irrigation. Held, that such diversion
was an unreasonable use and could be enjoined.
The court held that the case could not be decided by either of the maxims,
Cuius est solum ejus est usque ad inferos, or Sic Wiere luo ut alienum non
laedas,-inconsistent principles which have been followed both as to surface
water; XII Yale Law Journal, 40; and to percolatin~g water. Gould v.
Eaton, III Cal. 639; Snith v. City of Brooklyn, i6o N. Y. 357. A reasonable
use was held the criterion as to the division of surface water in City of
Franklin v. Durgee, (N. H.) 5i AtI. 9II; and of percolating water in Basset
v. Manufacturing Co., 43 N. H. 569. This principle is commendable as
a compromise between the extreme doctrines of the maxims.
